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Abstract
Unanticipated accumulation and dissemination of
accurate location information flows is the latest
iteration of the privacy debate. This mixed-methods
research contributes a grounded understanding of risk
perceptions, enablers and barriers to privacy preserving
behaviour in a cyber-physical environment.
We conducted the first representative survey on
internet privacy concerns, cyber and physical risk
taking, privacy victimisation, usage of location sharing
apps and transport choices in the UK with 466
participants. The responses segregated participants into
four distinct, novel clusters (cyber risk takers, physical
risk takers, transport innovators, and risk abstainers)
with cross-validated prediction accuracy of 92%.
In the second part of the study, we qualitatively
explored these clusters through 12 homogeneous focus
groups with 6 participants each. The predominant
themes of the groups matched their clusters with
little overlap between the groups. The differences in
risk perception and behaviours varied greatly between
the clusters. Future transport systems, apps and
websites that rely on location data therefore need a
more personalised approach to information provision
surrounding location sharing. Failing to recognise these
differences could lead to reduced data sharing, riskier
sharing behaviour or even total avoidance of new forms
of technology in transport.

1.

Introduction

Recent revelations about the use of Strava to identify
American military bases in the Middle East [1] have
revived the debate on location tracking. The motivations
for collecting detailed, high accuracy location data
are obvious: for public transport, automatic departure,
disruption and routing information is valued.
In
connected and autonomous transport systems, location
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data sharing is attached to improvements in road safety,
accident prevention, information for emergency and
breakdown recovery situations, and other economic
and environmental benefits for the driver, passengers
and other road users [2]. Future transport systems
will rely on an ever more interconnected, real-time
information system that requires continuous location
data from its users for reliable and efficient resource
allocation. In addition to the privacy invasion of highly
targeted advertising, there are also physical consequence
stemming from the abuse of this data. Houses are
often burgled when they are unoccupied [3], expensive
bicycles are identified and located through social fitness
networks [4], relationships and social activities can be
monitored, and harassment and domestic abuse can be
facilitated [5].
Previous research has studied the responses to
privacy risks, and motivations and coping behaviours in
great detail, as we will discuss in the literature review
in Section 2. However, research on location privacy has
exclusively focused on transparent, transactional privacy
invasions, such as ‘check-in’ systems and location-based
advertising systems where there is a clear, immediate
reward for giving up one’s location privacy for a short
period. Instead, we study opaque location disclosures in
a cyber-physical transport environment. Here location
disclosure is not a means to an end, but rather part
of a service that individuals cannot do without. To
this end, our mixed-method research combines several
existing scales on privacy concerns, cyber and physical
risk taking, and transport choices (Section 3). We
qualitatively analyse focus groups (Section 4) to explore
the underlying motivations influencing location sharing
and their impact on cyber-physical risk perceptions. We
answer the following research questions:
RQ1: Do individuals cluster by their Internet privacy
concerns and cyber and physical risk taking?
RQ2: How do the clusters compare in their experiences
of location sharing?
RQ3: What can be learned to encourage adoption of
future location based systems?
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This research contributes a detailed understanding
of how digital and physical concerns and behaviours
coincide. The mixed-methods approach allows us to
statistically examine behavioural constructs, and then
explore how these manifest in location sharing risk
perceptions and behaviours. This gives rise to several
recommendations for policy (Section 5).

in the Internet [14]. Their model incorporates the
dimensions ‘perceived vulnerability’ and ‘perceived
ability to control information’. We found that the
questions from Malhotra et al. [15] and Earp et al. [13]
were more fitting for the context of our study, but that
Dinev et al.’s questions [14] provided a useful basis for
the development of our own items.

2.

2.2.

Related Literature

Many aspects of attitudes towards privacy have been
studied. The privacy sub-type Privacy of Location and
Space [6], which gives individuals the right to move in
public without being tracked, identified or monitored is
a particularly contentious issue nowadays. The authors
consider various emerging technologies that impact
on privacy; however, connected transport, self-driving
cars and social fitness networks are not considered.
The main research on location privacy is focused on
either the advertising context [7], [8], check-in systems
or Location Sharing Social Networks [9], [10], or
anonymising location data through privacy enhancing
technologies and statistical techniques [11].
However, we are interested in location privacy
concerns in cyber-physical transport systems. This is
an under-researched area, and no scales exist that can
support participant segmentation. Moreover, transport
is inherently physical, so it seems appropriate to view
our research as a combination of Internet/information
privacy concerns, and physical risk attitudes.

2.1.

Privacy concerns

General privacy concerns is a well studied field.
With existing scales, there is variation in the quality,
application area and different approaches to measuring
privacy concerns. Preibusch gives a comprehensive
overview of the field [12], and recommends a number
of validity-tested scales (such as [13]–[15]) that we will
use in this research.
Earp et al. built and validated a construct on privacy
values and concerns grounded in privacy policies [13].
The privacy protection goals underpinning the survey
design are more akin to data protection principles,
which fit well with our study’s aim. The items
were reviewed using survey experts and a panel of
privacy experts, and pretested for reliability. Although
designed to study e-commerce, the construct on Internet
users’ information privacy concerns (IUIPC) [15] is
context-agnostic and widely used to research digital
privacy concerns. In combination with the scale by
Earp et al., the questions give good coverage of data
protection, privacy and Internet behaviour. Dinev et
al. assemble another construct on privacy concerns

Existing privacy segmentation studies

There are a number of existing segmentation studies
for privacy types.
Historically, one of Westin’s
Privacy indices has been frequently used [16]. For
example, Westin’s Core Privacy Orientation Index
segments participants into three groups: Privacy
Fundamentalists, Privacy Unconcerned and Privacy
Pragmatists. It has been used in mixed-methods studies
on organisational, technological and environmental
factors which influence technology adoption [17].
An alternative approach is described by Morton
et al., who use a Q methodology to segment
participants based on the type of information cues they
consider important [18]. The authors identify five
groups: Information Controllers, Security Concerned,
Benefit Seekers, Crowd Followers, and Organisational
Assurance Seekers. Both Westin and Morton’s approach
to segmentation are valuable to their respective domains.

2.3.

Location privacy research

The existing location privacy research primarily
concerns itself with individuals’ predispositions that
influence their location privacy stance. Early studies
concluded that people are not aware and do not care
about being tracked [19], [20]. Krumm surveyed the
literature in 2009 [20], and found that while research had
identified the problem of location privacy and devised
anonymisation techniques in response, people do not
care about location privacy. Since then, researchers have
identified that privacy expectations and concerns vary
significantly by demographics and online activity [21],
or by personal innovativeness [8]. Privacy concerns
significantly influence continued adoption as compared
to initial adoption [8]. There is no one fit-for-all solution
for location based services.

2.4.

Physical Risk

The Domain-Specific Risk Taking scale covers
Ethics, Financial, Health/Safety, Recreational and
Social aspects of risk [22]. Given the diverse physical
risks of transport systems that can arise from location
disclosure, this widely used and well established scale
is highly appropriate for our research.
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3.

Survey study

Likert

scenarios to measure the effect of the sensitivity of
personal information requested [15]. Based on these,
we created three scenarios for the location environment.
While IUIPC focuses on the privacy concerns of users,
the scale by Earp et al. includes potentially positive
aspects of location data such as personalisation and
participation of users [13].
In order to incorporate the physical aspects of
location data, we included the Domain Specific Risk
Taking (DOSPERT) scale [22]. Participants respond
twice to 30 statements, once indicating how risky they
perceive the statement to be, and once indicating how
likely they are to engage in the described activity or
behaviour.
We additionally introduced a new set of questions
on privacy victimisation, and physical transport choices
and concerns. These questions were developed in an
iterative process with domain experts, and are similar
to questions from [13], [24] and [14].
We carried out a power analysis for our segmentation
analysis [25] before commencing data collection: taking
IUIPC, Earp et al.’s scale, Dospert Likely, Dospert
Risky, Transport Concerns, Transport Choices as
dimensions, at least 420 participants are required to
achieve 95% confidence in the segments [25]. We chose
to recruit 520 participants. The survey included several
attention checks. After removing participants who failed
at least two, we ended up with 466 valid responses.
The majority of our participants walk or use cars
as their main mode of transport, with 92% and 75%
respectively using them at least once a week. Busses
or trains are used much less frequently, with only 24%
and 11% using them at least once a week. Ride sharing
services were used infrequently, with 76% stating they
never used them, and 13% stating they use them less
than once a month.

agree

3.2.

Our aim in this part was to establish a robust
grouping of participants which can be recovered through
a small set of questions, rather than through an extensive
survey. We conduct a comprehensive survey featuring a
variety of relevant scales. We cluster the participants’
responses, and identify a small set of survey questions
that accurately predict the clusters. The survey study
was conducted on LimeSurvey and participants were
recruited using Prolific, a crowdsourcing platform.
Based on the mid-2017 demographic distribution of the
UK [23], we recruited 8 groups representative of the
18–24, 25–44, 45–64 and 65+ age brackets and two
genders. All participants were required to be resident in
the UK. This study was approved by the relevant ethics
committee, and participants were shown an information
sheet and gave informed consent for their participation.
No personal identifiable information was collected as
part of this study. The participants were reimbursed at a
rate of £10 per hour and the survey took on average 17
minutes to complete.

3.1.

Methodology

As discussed in the literature review, there are a large
number of survey scales related to privacy. However,
there is little in the domain of transport/location privacy.
Instead of designing, testing and evaluating yet another
scale, we chose to rely on a combination of existing,
validated scales. An overview of the scales used can
be found in Table 1. All Likert type questions were
measured on a 7-point scale. The full survey text can
be found in our supplementary material.
Table 1. Overview of survey questions.

Scale
Internet Users’ Information
Privacy Concerns (IUIPC)
Information Sensitivity
Scenarios
Online Privacy Concerns
Domain Specific Risk
Taking (DOSPERT)
Online privacy relationship
Transport choices

# Q. Source
12 [15]

15 adapted
from [15]
28 [13]
agree
60 [22]
risky &
likely
18
9

The Internet Users’ Information Privacy Concerns
(IUIPC) construct [15] fits our research objectives well,
as it focuses on technology related privacy concerns.
It consists of three dimensions: collection, control and
awareness, which are also applicable to the location
privacy environment. Malhotra et al. also included two

Clusters of similar users

All responses to the scales outlined in Table 1 were
clustered using k-means clustering after standardising
and a dimensionality reduction using Principal
Component Analysis (PCA). In PCA, the responses
are transformed to a smaller space that preserves the
variance while discarding noise. This improves the
performance of the subsequent clustering, where the
space is divided into k clusters of similar variance.
Each transformed observation belongs to the cluster
with the nearest mean. The number of clusters was
chosen by evaluating the predictive capacity of a logistic
regression classifier to recover the clusters, using 5-fold
cross-validation. Four clusters had the highest accuracy
at 92%. Visual inspection through silhouette analysis
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3.3.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics.

CR

PR

TI

Reduced survey set

RA

Num. Participants
159 103 104 100
Average Age
53.5 51.0 42.4 36.5
Standard dev. Age
15.8 14.7 15.5 13.9
Percentage Male
34% 56% 44% 63%
2.0 1.8* 0.5** 1.7
IUIPC Collection
IUIPC Control
2.0 1.8 1.1** 1.8*
IUIPC Awareness
2.6 2.3 1.6** 2.3**
E. Personalization
1.9 1.6* 0.0** 0.9**
2.6 2.3** 1.2** 2.1**
E. Notice / Awareness
E. Transfer
2.7 2.7 1.3** 2.3**
E. Collection
2.4 2.2** 0.7** 1.4**
E. Information Storage
2.5 2.2** 1.4** 1.9*
E. Access / Participation 2.2 1.9* 0.8** 1.7
−1.6**−0.9**−1.3**−0.4
DOSPERT Likely
DOSPERT Risky
1.1 −0.4** 0.2** 0.0**
Cyber risk takers (CR), physical risk takers (PR), transport
innovators (TI), and risk abstainers (RA). Mean scores are
presented for each scale. Within each row, ** / * indicates a
statistically significant difference at p < 0.01/0.05 between
the distribution of responses of a given group compared to the
distribution of responses with the group with the next largest
mean (unpaired t-test). The four shades of cell background
are used to denote the statistically significant ordering of the
mean values in each row.

confirmed a clear separation of responses into 4 separate
clusters. The responses from participants in these four
clusters indicated the following four types: cyber risk
takers, physical risk takers, transport innovators, and
risk abstainers. Descriptive statistics for participants for
each of these groups can be found in Table 2.
Our participants spread reasonably equally across
the four types.
There are minor demographic
differences, with risk abstainers being younger and more
male than other groups. The group identified as cyber
risk takers is substantially more female.
Our clusters split the existing scales into statistically
significant segments, highlighting the link between their
discriminant validity and ours. The transport innovators
score statistically significantly lowest on all IUIPC
and Earp et al. factors [13], [15]. However when
considering physical risks, the transport innovators are
more middling. Conversely, the cyber risk takers
consistently score highest across all IUIPC and Earp et
al. factors. These participants are the most concerned
about all aspects of information privacy, and want full
control over their data. At the same time they are averse
to physical risk. Physical risk takers are, as expected,
least likely to consider the DOSPERT statements to be
risky, while being most likely to undertake them.

It is infeasible to use a 142 question survey to cluster
users in subsequent studies or real-life applications.
Therefore, we reduced the number of questions required
to group the participants into the 4 clusters from
142 to 17. The literature describes a variety of
methods. Essentially each of our questions is treated as
a feature, and the task becomes one of feature selection.
Several methods were attempted, such as correlation
based feature selection [26], feature importance ranking
with random forest trees, and mutual information,
chi-squared and ANOVA F-test based feature selection.
We compared the performance of these in a 5-fold cross
validated setting of the predictive capacity of a logistic
regression classifier to recover the clusters for features
in the range between 1 and 142. Recursive feature
elimination performed best and achieved an accuracy
score of 0.75 with 17 questions which was deemed an
acceptable trade-off between numbers of questions and
accuracy by the authors.
The full reduced question set can be found in the
supplementary files. Two of the questions are drawn
from IUIPC [15], five from Earp et al. [13], and
two stem from our own questions. Two and five
statements remain for the DOSPERT Likely and Risky
scales respectively [22]. The final question is scenario
three, where participants respond on a 7-point Not
probable/probable scale.

3.4.

Discussion

Answering RQ1, this research has demonstrated
that there are distinct privacy types in the location
privacy environment. These types are not demographic
artefacts, but rather describe inherently different
attitudes.
The types partially align with the
existing privacy constructs, but are extended through
a combination of physical risk perceptions and risk
taking. Each cluster has distinct properties that make
them suitable for tailoring interventions and messaging
specifically at them. The reduced question set makes it
possible to accurately classify an individual into one of
these four clusters with only 17 questions.

4.

Focus groups

This section qualitatively explores the underlying
motivations influencing location sharing and their
impact on cyber-physical risk perceptions, and
investigates acceptable options to reducing these risks.
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4.1.

Methodology

Participants
were
recruited
through
our
organisation’s participant pool. This database includes
details of over 2000 residents in the area who had
registered an interest and consented to be contacted for
research purposes. The reduced survey set described
previously was used for pre-screening. Each participant
was assigned to one of the four privacy types. For each
of the 4 types, we conducted 3 separate focus groups
with 6 participants per group. The study was reviewed
and received ethics approval.
4.1.1. Design Focus groups offer a comfortable
environment to promote discussion and allow
participants to discuss their views, thoughts and
beliefs on the topic. We used homogeneous groups
(same attitude to risk cluster) of strangers, which are
favoured when exploring personal and sensitive topics
such as privacy as those taking part have similarities
as well as having their own experiences and opinions
regarding the topic discussed.
The topic guide was split into four key sections.
The first focused on the motivations that influenced
location sharing on transport-based apps, the second
on the perceived benefits and risks associated with
location sharing, the third on the possible relationship
between location sharing and cyber-physical crime, and
the fourth on identifying the tools that would support
members of the general public to make safer and more
informed decisions when choosing to share location. We
did not collect any other demographics, or information
on our participants’ use of transport apps or transport
choices.
4.1.2. Procedure After being identified through
their survey responses, participants were sent an
email inviting them to take part in a focus group.
The email included the consent form and participant
information sheet. The focus groups took place at
our organisation, and lasted approximately 90 minutes.
Focus groups were recorded for transcription. At
the beginning of each focus group, participants were
once again presented with the information sheet and
consent form and reminded of their right to withdraw.
Participants were reminded of the nature of the study, its
confidentiality and anonymity. At this point recording
began. Two researchers were present during each focus
group. One facilitated the focus group while the other
took notes. These were also used in the analysis
of the data. Once the focus groups were completed
participants were provided with a full debrief and the
opportunity to raise any further questions. Participants
were given a £25 incentive.

4.2.

Data analysis

Upon completion the focus groups were transcribed
and analysed by one researcher using inductive thematic
analysis via NVivo. Thematic analysis provides a strong
analytical tool to identify, analyse and report patterns
within a data set, a key criterion due to the exploratory
nature of this study. In addition, its independence from
any theoretical framework makes it a strong analytical
tool for this study. An inductive approach was chosen
to ensure that the findings were based entirely upon the
data and generated by the respondents themselves, not
driven by any previous theoretical ideas. The chosen
methodology allowed for an in-depth and detailed
analysis of the participants’ own thoughts within this
novel area. After coding two out of the three focus
groups for each cluster, saturation was reached; the third
focus groups added only minor nuances.

4.3.

Results: common themes

The themes discovered in the focus group and
their occurrence between the groups can be seen
in Table 3.
In response to RQ2, many of the
themes support our clustering and the participants’
responses to the segmentation scales: for example, both
types of risk takers believed that location disclosures
improve the safety of the system to users.
All
clusters believed that age would influence location
sharing decisions, but interestingly, the age distribution
between the clusters is not statistically significantly
different. Transport innovators were positive about
the consequences of location sharing, believing that
it offered improved choice, better accountability, and
more accurate information provided by systems. The
following sections will discuss the commonalities and
differences of these groups that surfaced during the
focus groups.
4.3.1. Age All clusters believed that age would
influence location sharing decisions with different
generations choosing different settings, predominantly
because they had different perceptions of risks:
‘That’s an age thing, isn’t it, as well, for us? These
guys, it’s automatic. For us, we make it more
complicated than it probably is.’
With younger generations growing up immersed in
technology it was believed that they knew more about
data sharing and therefore would be less susceptible than
older generations to fall into some of the traps set out
by perpetrators. However, while younger generations
may be more immersed in technology and have an
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Table 3. Focus group responses for different clusters.

Clusters
CR PR TI RA
3
3 3
3
3
3 3 3
3
3
3 3 3
3

3
3

3 3 3
3
3
3

3
3 3

3
3
3
3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3
3 3 3
3
3
3
3 3 3

Factors influencing location
sharing decision

3 Safety (improving)
Safety (reducing): includes physical
safety (attacks, burglaries)
3 Value attributed to data (lack of)
Security of the device itself
3 Defeatist towards preventing cybercrime
3 Age: generational differences in how
location was shared and why
Job
Ease of use
Convenience and frustration with app
(hassle of entering location manually)
Functionality
Accuracy and real-time information
provision
3 Trust in the app provider (or lack of)
3 Transparency of the app provider (what
is collected, why, how and for whom)
3 Privacy: particularly loss of privacy
3 Providing and receiving a service/benefit
3 Uncertainty of future transport systems
Mood
Environment
3 Storing vs data sharing
3 Ability to stay anonymous when sharing
3 Having a choice in the decision of
whether their data is shared or not
Size of audience (lack of understanding)
3 Apps’ reason for accessing location
3 Personal bad prior experience
3 Recommendations and experiences from
family and friends
Recommendations from online networks
3 Reputation of app provider (history of
data misuse or breaches)
Accountability of the app provider in the
event of something going wrong
3 Lack of understanding of the potential
risks associated with location sharing
and new forms of crime
3 Vulnerability of the network through
which data is shared

cyber risk takers (CR), physical risk takers (PR), transport
innovators (TI), and risk abstainers (RA).

overall awareness of the risks of location sharing there
was an overall belief that younger generations were too
naı̈ve when it came to data sharing as a result of their
familiarity with these technologies and consequently did
not appreciate the risks.

The perceptions on age shown in the focus groups
appear contradictory to our clusters, where cyber risk
takers had the highest mean age, and the risk averse
cluster had the lowest mean age. However this may be
false confidence: rather than being risk averse, the older
generation appears to be ignorant of the risks. The cyber
risk takers judge physical risk highest and are least likely
to do risky activities. However, this behaviour does not
translate into online risk taking.
4.3.2. Trust (or lack of) in the app provider Trust
was another important factor across all of the clusters,
and particularly trust in the app provider. Trust was quite
a complex notion and was made up of several different
elements which included whether the app provider
was a recognised name. All the clusters, apart from
the physical risk takers, felt more comfortable sharing
location data with a recognised ‘household name’ than a
new start-up.
‘We trust British Airways, for whatever reasons,
it’s institutional names, recognised and it’s safe. I
would with them, that wouldn’t worry me, it’s a
trusted organisation.’
However, physical risk takers were less likely to
trust big organisations and therefore share their location
with them. This was due to the frequent media reports
surrounding the misuse of data by bigger organisations
leading to them questioning what was ‘happening in the
background’.
Friends and family, who they believed to have their
best interest at heart, were seen as the only reliable
source. Only the cyber risk takers also used reviews
from online communities even though they were aware
that these ‘had to be taken with a pinch of salt’ and
should be read as part of a wider context:
‘Yes, friends and family, because you would hope
that they’re not going to recommend something or
someone dodgy, so yes, you would always, I think,
go with their recommendation.’
4.3.3. Transparency of the app provider Across
all groups this was one of the most important factors that
influenced their decision making process when choosing
to share location. Organisations that were open about
why they were accessing the information, why they
requested location sharing, how the data was being
used, who was accessing the data, and how the data
was shared were ones that users felt more comfortable
sharing location with.
When faced with the prospect of ever more
connected transport systems, all users demanded more
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transparency, with some going as far as saying that
this should be a legal requirement. Indeed, participants
believed that increased transparency from the app
provider about why they are collecting the data, what
data they are collecting, and for whom would encourage
more data sharing on the user’s part:
‘So, it’s a question of information, I think, going
forward, without pages and pages and pages of
s**** to read and you go, ‘yeah’, but easy to
understand. Where is data stored, what do they do
with it, what criminals are out there, how can they
use it, that sort of thing.’

4.3.4. Safety All clusters mentioned safety as an
important factor when choosing to share location
information, but there was a divide across the clusters
in terms of those who believed that location sharing
could improve safety and those who thought that
overall it would lead to reduced safety. While all
clusters recognised the possible risks associated with
location sharing, cyber risk takers and risk abstainers
saw sharing location as having a number of safety
benefits, particularly towards ensuring the safety of
other. Members of these clusters consistently reported
that location sharing provided ‘reassurance’, allowing
them to know the whereabouts of children, particularly
children with special needs, family members and
generally more vulnerable members of society (older
adults, especially ones with more neurological
disabilities).
‘I’d say it’d be useful, I mean, I do some voluntary
work with dementia groups, and some of those poor
people, I think, that app, to track them, if they went
missing from home and you didn’t know where they
were, that would be an absolutely fantastic app.’
These clusters were very realistic about the potential
risks associated with location sharing, however there
was an overall agreement that there was already so
many other things to worry about without having to
worry about location sharing. Therefore when choosing
to share location users worked out the degree of
risk associated with sharing their data, whereby they
weighed their perceived risks and benefits of sharing
location and made their decision from there. If the
risks, which tended to be linked to physical crimes
(such as being attacked or burglaries), cyber-crimes
(identity theft, financial crime) and cyber-physical crime
(cyber and physical stalking) outweighed the benefits
significantly then they may reconsider sharing their
location.

‘I work out what risk am I actually running by
giving someone my location, and I think it’s so
minimal, I don’t worry and I share it.’

4.4.

Results: differences between clusters

Here we discuss some of the differences between
clusters in more detail.
4.4.1. Future transport systems Cyber risk takers
discussed several concerns over future types of crimes
and particularly in relation to connected vehicles and
future transport systems more generally. One of the
main concerns was the ethics surrounding these types
of vehicles, particularly how they would act in the event
of an road collision, leading to a lack of trust:
‘Who’s culpable in a driverless car, if something
happens?’
Members of this cluster reported concerns over what
data would be required, who would be able to access this
data, how the data would be used and how the transport
systems would work. This lack of certainty often lead
to concerns over location sharing in these new forms
of transport as it was unclear what the possible risks
could be. However, there was also an awareness of the
many benefits that could come with increased location
sharing in future transport systems. The increased
connectedness of the transport systems might lead to
them being easier to navigate, making travelling faster
and more accessible, as well as safer. However, it was
evident that for this group the risks of location sharing
on future transport systems was not yet understood:
‘Human error has to account for an awful lot of
accidents, so if you took away human error and
human stupidity, probably in the long run, the
automated vehicle would probably cause a lot less
injuries than humans do, to be fair, but it’s still that,
you just don’t know enough about all of it.’
4.4.2. Storing vs sharing data For physical risk
takers there seemed to be a clear distinction between
sharing and storing data. While this group may
feel comfortable sharing their location in certain
instances, they did not want this data to be stored.
The storing element seemed to be the one that was
associated with the most risks with some users saving
incorrect addresses (for example postcode only or
former addresses) in their vehicles or apps in order to
avoid their personal information being misused in the
even of their vehicles being stolen or their phone being
hacked.
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‘My Sat Nav in my car, I think if my car’s stolen, I
don’t want people knowing my actual address, so I
just put it into the postcode, so it could be anywhere.
I don’t mind sharing information but I don’t want
them to have it, if that makes sense’
4.4.3. Accuracy and real-time information
provision While many other clusters shared location
with the aim of receiving a service, transport innovators
paid particular attention to the information provision
that came with location sharing. They perceived the
increased accuracy of information due to location
sharing as one of the highest benefits, particularly when
using a navigation tool.
‘Some of the apps, if you’re looking for somewhere
in the locality you are, yes, it’s great, just share your
location, if you’re out and about, it’s fine, and it’ll
come up with, I don’t know, any sort of shops or
whatever you want, because that’s very convenient’
They were aware that sharing location was
associated with potential risks, but these risks were
considered as worthwhile if it meant that real-time
information provision could be obtained.
4.4.4. Accountability of the app provider One of
the concerns of transport innovators was the lack of
accountability if there was a data breach, or data was
misused.
‘I’m not saying it’s easy but I think, as I said, we
need to start holding people accountable for some
of the things that they’re doing.’
They reported that this was a barrier to sharing
location with certain apps, particularly ones that may
have previous incidences of data breaches and failing
to take accountability for these. Members of this
cluster reported that they would be more willing to
share location with an app if there was someone that
they could seek information from and that would be
held accountable in the event that something went
wrong. They reported that this accountability should be
something required from all organisations and a priority
for future transport systems.
‘Something has to be done to hold them to account
going forward. That should be a priority.’
4.4.5. Attitude towards preventing cybercrime
Unlike other clusters that were aware of the potential
risks associated with sharing location, risk abstainers
had a very defeatist attitude towards being able to
prevent perpetrators from committing crimes:

‘I’m sure there are people out there that if they want
it, it’s like breaking into cars, you can have the
security in the world, but if they want something in
there, they’ll get in there, like your house or your
data.’
Indeed, this group were unsure whether as a society
we were able to cope with these new forms of crimes
and consequently the new types of perpetrators that
were emerging (e.g. hackers). They reported that
perpetrators were smart and continuously getting more
sophisticated, making it hard to see what could actually
be done to avoid being a victim of these new types
of crime and prevent them more generally. There was
an overall understanding that perpetrators are always
getting smarter and therefore it was always about
‘staying one step ahead for as long as possible’.
‘But all the hackers are always one step ahead of
the Facebook and the Instagram.’
This group believed that their data was not
particularly valuable, therefore they had no problem
with sharing their location. Further they felt that if an
organisation or a perpetrator wanted to access their data,
they could do nothing about it.
4.4.6. Ability to stay anonymous While other
clusters discussed the differences between sharing and
storing data, risk abstainers placed particular importance
on the ability to stay anonymous when sharing their
data. They reported that if they were able to share their
data anonymously, with none of their data actually being
traceable to them they would be more willing to share
their location. This was especially the case if it could
help improve services overall.
‘If your identity and your very sensitive material
remains anonymous, then I’m happy for me to be,
let’s say, more of a statistic, especially if that then
goes on to provide more useful information to help
us get round. Great, but yes, I would much rather
that they don’t know who it is exactly.’

5.

Discussion

This part of the study aimed to explore in more detail
the factors that influenced location sharing decisions
across four distinct clusters, particularly the similarities
and differences across each of these groups.
Overall the qualitative analysis highlighted a number
of important differences across each of the clusters,
providing further support for the four distinct groups
that were identified. These differences demonstrated
varying approaches to location sharing. Some clusters
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placed greater weight on the possible benefits, which
ranged from providing a service to a community to
improving the accuracy of the information that they
could obtain. Other benefits were very much grounded
in improved safety, whereby location sharing could
ensure the security and safety of some of the more
vulnerable members of society. On the other hand, some
were very concerned about sharing their location as they
believed that despite the possible benefits, they were far
outweighed by the risks and the new types of crime that
could emerge as a result of increased location sharing
(for example car-hacking, burglaries, and crimes that
happened across both the cyber and physical domains
such as stalking/cyber-stalking).
In response to RQ3, these differences in the values
influencing location sharing provide further support
for the need for a more tailored and personalised
approach to information provision. Failing to recognise
these differences in motivations could lead to reduced
data sharing or more risky sharing behaviour by some
clusters.
While there were differences across these clusters,
there were also a number of motivations that were
common across all four. Participants agreed on the
importance of transparency from those requesting their
data. The lack of understanding over how data was
currently being used, why it was being collected,
who could access it and how it was being shared
was a particular concern. Overall, the clusters all
acknowledged that location sharing would be a necessity
for future transport systems, however many felt resistant
to making this change, in part due to the feeling
of ‘having no say in the matter’, and app providers
or data controllers failing to provide the information
they required in an accessible way. Our participants
essentially resign themselves to the privacy paradox as
they accept the seemingly necessity to surrender their
location privacy [27]. At no point did the discussion
touch upon GDPR or other existing legislation.
Behaviour change is an extremely complex process
and as research has consistently demonstrated, attitudes
are not the strongest predictor of future behaviour,
but are only one of the factors influencing behaviour.
Most models and the behavioural literature more widely
emphasise that relying on attitudes to explain behaviour
has several limitations.
For example, cognitive
dissonance theory [28] highlights the discrepancies
between attitudes and behaviour, including in relation
to privacy behaviour [29]. The qualitative work carried
out as part of this research has allowed us to address
these limitations by exploring in much more depth
the values and motivations influencing behaviour and
location sharing behaviour more specifically.

5.1.

Implications for policy

The findings from this research have an number
of impacts on potential future policies. The evidence
provides support for a more tailored and personalised
approach to information provision surrounding location
sharing in future transport systems, including transport
apps and websites. Failing to recognise these differences
could lead to reduced data sharing, riskier sharing
behaviour increasing the likelihood of users being
victims or perpetrating cyber-physical crimes or even
total avoidance of new forms of transport.
One of the key implications for policy is the need
for increased transparency from app providers as well as
transport providers if they want to ensure the retention
and safety of their users. In order to achieve this, and
help rebuild trust in app providers, many participants
suggested the need for better standards and independent
regulatory bodies to uphold those standards. In the event
of a crime (physical or cyber) that was promoted by
these tools, those responsible need to be held to account.
In addition, continuous education tailored to the needs
of the different segments should be considered. Finally,
further research should be conducted to identify the
benefits of tailored information provision in supporting
informed location sharing decisions, and the most
successful medium through which this can be achieved.

6.

Conclusion

This research contributes a novel understanding
of privacy concerns in the area of cyber-physical
systems. Based on existing scales both from cyber and
physical areas and a UK representative study with 466
participants, we have identified a new set of location
privacy types that can classify an individual accurately
in just 17 questions. Through a mixed-methods study
design, we explored these types in more detail through
homogeneous focus groups, identifying differences in
risk appetite and risk understanding. Age of individuals,
trust and transparency (or lack thereof) of providers
as well as safety implications are common factors
perceived to influence location sharing decisions of all
clusters. Cyber risk takers are distinctive, as they prefer
convenience and do not value their data highly. Despite
this, they are apprehensive of physical risks. Physical
risk takers are more influenced by their mood and
environmental factors, and struggle with the perpetuity
of shared data. Transport innovators stand out through
their dedication to technology.
They experiment,
and believe in the accountability of providers. Risk
abstainers had the youngest average age in our sample.
They are defeatists, and will only share their data if
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they remain anonymous and can trust the security of the
infrastructure.
These differences of opinion will give rise to diverse
demands on providers and legislators. Public services
need to be accessible to everyone, so it is essential
that expectations are incorporated into design processes
and that individuals’ rights are respected. If service
providers wish to attract users from these four diverse
clusters they will need to address each groups’ needs
and preferences in a targeted manner.

Data Availability
The full and reduced survey set and the analysis
files can be found at https://github.com/
watercrossing/privacy-in-transport.
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